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DIMITER G. ANGELOV 
Recent years have seen a new rise of interest in the history of Byzantine 
political and social thought. Almost no attention has been paid, however, to 
the ways in which Byzantine authors classified and defined politics as a 
philosophical discipline on the basis of the ancient premise that the intel-
lectual inquiry into politics belonged to the field of philosophy.1 The 
Byzantine divisions of philosophy (divisiones philosophiae) and other 
classificatory texts are particularly revealing in this regard. They contain in 
a nutshell a description of the preoccupations of politics as a philosophical 
discipline, and comment on the connection of politics with other areas of 
philosophical knowledge. The taxonomic descriptions are a rich source ma-
terial for studying continuity and change in the usage of political concepts 
with philosophical origin and content. My discussion will consist of three 
parts: first, an examination of the classification of political philosophy in the 
divisions of philosophy; second, an attempt at historicizing some notably 
divergent views on political philosophy voiced in a classificatory context; 
and third, an investigation of the usage and significance of the Platonic con-
cept of royal science (βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήµη), which was sometimes applied to 
the taxonomic description of philosophy and its divisions. 
A note should be made at the outset about the methods, approaches and 
limitations of the following discussion. The discussion aims to highlight sa-
lient tendencies in the classification of political philosophy and is not 
comprehensive. The time span covered is mostly the period after the elev-
enth century, but occasionally material will be drawn from late antique as 
well as ancient philosophy. Historical factors are intentionally taken into 
consideration, because my guiding assumption is that no corpus of political 
ideas, regardless of its intellectual and discursive context, can evolve in 
isolation from surrounding forms of social organization. Therefore I will ask 
questions about the historical relevance of the examined notions of political 
philosophy—that is, the extent and ways in which the human good, the ob-
                                                
1 I take the present opportunity to continue the preliminary observations made in Angelov 
(2007: 9). 
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jective of political philosophy, is also recognizably the human good of 
contemporary Byzantium. No attempt will be made to broach the issue of 
whether or in what ways the term ‘political philosophy’ is an appropriate 
label for the field of Byzantine political and social thought. The resolution 
of this issue depends ultimately on modern conceptions and judgements. 
Rather, my narrow goal is to address the problem of definition on its own 
terms, through the conceptual vocabulary used by Byzantine authors. The 
source material used consists mostly of philosophical texts, but also in-
cludes texts belonging to other genres. This broader scope is in a way 
inevitable. In their most developed form, the divisiones philosophiae are 
found in predominantly scholastic works composed in the context of teach-
ing activity and reflecting educational tradition. The concepts framed or 
used in the classroom had a circulation beyond its narrow confines. It has 
been aptly noted one should search for Byzantine philosophy not only on 
the pages of treatises and commentaries on ancient philosophical works, but 
also in a broader generic context, including orations and letters with phi-
losophical content.2 The investigation of Byzantine political thought needs 
also to consider genres normally disassociated with philosophy: primarily 
epideictic rhetoric, letters, and historiography, but also devotional and ec-
clesiastical literature, and even poetry. For the Byzantine philosophers were 
often authors with encyclopedic interests and a prolific literary output where 
they presented and discussed philosophical ideas. 
 
Divisions of philosophy: the place of politics  
The natural starting point for examining the divisions of philosophy known 
in Byzantium is the influential Alexandrian tradition of the Prolegomena 
philosophiae: basic introductions to the discipline which normally precede 
the line-by-line commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge. The Prolegomena 
succinctly define and classify the philosophical disciplines in a way useful 
for the beginning student. Their authors—Ammonius, Olympiodorus, 
David, Elias and Pseudo-Elias (Stephanus)—were professors of philosophy 
with a Neoplatonic outlook who taught, at least for some periods of their 
lives, in Alexandria between the late fifth and the early seventh century.3 
                                                
2 Ierodiakonou (2002: 6). 
3 On the Alexandrian school, see Lloyd (1967: 314–19); O’Meara (2003: 23–26); Watts 
(2006: 143–256). Pseudo-Elias has been plausibly identified as Stephanus of Alexandria by 
Wolska-Conus (1989: 69–82) (see also Roueché 1990: 123–27). A comparative summary 
of the prolegomena to philosophy by Ammonius, Elias, David and Pseudo-Elias (that is, 
Stephanus) can be found in Westerink (1990: 344–47). 
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Each Prolegomenon responds to or builds on earlier Prolegomena; the re-
sulting educational literature testifies to contemporary as well as past 
debates in the philosophical schools. All surviving Prolegomena divide 
philosophy into theoretical and practical, subdividing further the branch of 
practical philosophy into ethics, economics and politics.4 The Prolegomena 
derive this tripartite division of practical philosophy from Aristotle by refer-
ring to Aristotle’s distinct treatises on each subject. As a further supporting 
argument, they highlight the different scales of engagement of each kind of 
practical philosophy with the human good: ethics deals with the good of an 
individual; economics, with the good of a single household; and politics, 
with that of an entire city. 
This neat tripartite division of practical philosophy was not universally 
accepted in late antiquity. The sixth-century Prolegomena of David, Elias 
and Pseudo-Elias (Stephanus) mention opposition to and disagreements with 
the Aristotelian interpretation. The objection is said to have come from the 
Platonists. Pointing out, inter alia, that the quantitatively different applica-
bility of ethics, economics and politics is an insufficient reason for them to 
be distinct sciences, the Platonists put forth an alternative division of practi-
cal philosophy into legislative and judicial. The reasons and logic behind 
this bipartite division need not concern us here. Suffice it to refer to 
Dominic O’Meara’s pioneering study, which successfully challenges the 
stereotype of the apolitical nature of Neoplatonism and has shown that the 
twofold division of practical philosophy reflects the Neoplatonic ideal of the 
divinization of human society through the extension of the internal constitu-
tion of the soul into the domestic order of the household and the political 
sphere.5 The debates on the divisions of practical philosophy reported in the 
sixth-century Prolegomena may be seen as an echo of discussions on politi-
cal virtue and the political sphere characteristic of late Neoplatonism. The 
Prolegomena of Elias and, in a more explicit fashion, David hint at an 
authorial preference for the Platonic bipartite division of practical philoso-
phy.6 In addition, it is notable that some of the Prolegomena—especially 
those of Elias and Pseudo-Elias (Stephanus)—attempt to play down the dif-
ferences between Aristotelians and Platonists by adducing different and 
                                                
4 Busse (1891: 15–16); Busse (1902: 7–8); Busse (1900a: 31–34); Busse (1900b: 74–76); 
Westerink (1967: 43–46). 
5 O’Meara (2003: 56–58). 
6 For Elias, see Busse (1900a: 32–34); David (Busse 1900b: 75–76) mentions that the 
Platonists raised their objections with ‘a good reason’ (ibid. 76.1: καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως). 
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somewhat forceful arguments.7 The sixth-century Alexandrian philosophers 
thus both seek to reconcile Aristotelians and Platonists, and reveal their own 
Platonic partiality. 
In the long run, the twofold division of practical philosophy mentioned 
by the Alexandrian Neoplatonists did not take hold in Byzantium. Byzantine 
philosophers were remarkably unanimous in their preference for the Aristo-
telian tripartite division. Examples broadly dispersed through time serve to 
illustrate this trend. In his Dialectica, John of Damascus (d. 749) chooses to 
mention the three parts constituting practical philosophy: ethics sets rules 
about the conduct of an individual; economics deals with a household; and 
politics with ‘cities and lands’ (πόλεσι καὶ χώραις).8 An anonymous 
Byzantine ‘school conversation’ (or rather, an educational questionnaire) 
traditionally dated to the eleventh century implies the same division. Here 
practical philosophy is exemplified by a reference to Aristotle’s Politics, 
Economics and Ethics.9 The Aristotelian commentator Eustratios of Nicaea 
(fl. c. 1112), whose ideas will be discussed more closely below, reports 
matter-of-factly the tripartite division of practical philosophy.10 Late 
Byzantine scholars continue to classify practical philosophy into its three 
branches. In his thirteenth-century Epitome logica, an influential and widely 
disseminated textbook on logic, the Nicaean scholar Nikephoros 
Blemmydes (1197–c. 1269) concurs with earlier opinions: the chapter of the 
Epitome devoted to the division of philosophy states that moral and eco-
nomic philosophers are the ones concerned with the good of individuals and 
households, while ‘a statesman (πολιτικός) is the individual leading and 
governing a city or cities in the best fashion’.11 The notion of political phi-
losophy as the preserve of the statesman is one worth keeping in mind. 
                                                
7 Busse (1900a: 34); Westerink (1967: 44–46). See also Westerink (1990: 347). Ammonius, 
an earlier representative of the Alexandrian philosophical school, subdivides further each of 
the three Aristotelian parts of practical philosophy into legislative and judicial without re-
porting any conflict between Platonists and Aristotelians. See Busse (1891: 15). 
8 John of Damascus, Dialectica 3 and 66; Fragmenta philosophica 8, in Kotter (1969–85: 
vol. I, 56; 137; 160). 
9 Treu (1893: 99). The so-called school conversation is in fact a list of general questions 
about grammar, rhetoric, philosophy, and law, which are all conveniently supplied with 
correct answers. Treu’s dating is uncertain, because it rests solely on the importance of law 
in the curriculum. Börje Bydén cautiously prefers to date the work within the period c. 
1050–c. 1300 and points to a text deriving from it in the fourteenth- or fifteenth-century 
Cod. Vat. gr. 1144. 
See Bydén (2003: 223; 2004: 147). 
10 Heylbut (1892: 1.25–3.31). 
11 Nikephoros Blemmydes, Epitome logica, in Migne (PG 142: col. 733B–C): ὁ δέ γε 
πόλιν ἢ πόλεις διεξάγων καὶ διακυβερνῶν ἀρίστως πολιτικός.  
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Blemmydes follows up the above comment by noting that practical philoso-
phy is implemented through legislation and justice.12 Thus, he considers 
legislative and judicial activity to be modes of operation of practical phi-
losophy rather than its constituent parts—an influence of the Prolegomena 
found also, as we will see, in Blemmydes’ preface to the Epitome.13 After 
Blemmydes, the early Palaiologan scholar and statesman Theodore 
Metochites (1270–1332), in a section on the division of philosophy in the 
preface to his astronomical treatise, refers to the three parts of practical 
philosophy, again pointing out that politics deals with human communities 
and social practices in the cities (πόλεσι).14  
To be sure, the tripartite division of practical philosophy into politics, 
economics and ethics was not the only interpretation in the Greek Middle 
Ages. In one of his minor philosophical works Michael Psellos suggests a 
hierarchical division of philosophy into self-contained tiers or levels without 
mentioning practical philosophy.15 The ‘sciences dealing with political mat-
ters’, set at the lowermost end of the taxonomic hierarchy of philosophy, 
consist of judicial and legislative science as well as rhetoric.16 The legisla-
tive and judicial segments of ‘the sciences dealing with political matters’ 
hark back to the taxonomic views of the Neoplatonists, in whose philosophy 
Psellos was interested. The Psellian interpretation, especially the inclusion 
of rhetoric among the political sciences, is highly idiosyncratic in the con-
text of the Byzantine divisiones philosophiae. As we have seen, the standard 
view in the divisiones was that political philosophy was an integral, self-
contained and autonomous discipline, one of the three branches of practical 
philosophy.  
Why did the tripartite definition of practical philosophy establish itself as 
the preferred one? One reason is that it provided a convenient template for 
the individual works in the Aristotelian corpus—the Byzantine ‘school dia-
logue’ illustrates the tripartite divisions of practical philosophy by referring 
                                                
12 Migne (PG 142: col. 733C): κατορθοῦται δὲ τὸ πᾶν πρακτικὸν διά τε τοῦ νοµο-
θετικοῦ καὶ δικαστικοῦ. 
13 Uthemann (1984: 120 and 135 n. 93) has argued that Blemmydes borrowed most of the 
content of this chapter of the Epitome from David’s Prolegomena and some of it from that 
of Ammonius. Blemmydes clearly does not follow David, who (see above n. 6) hints at his 
preference for the bipartite division of practical philosophy into legislative and judicial. It is 
possible that Blemmydes was influenced by Ammonius who subdivides each division of 
practical philosophy (ethics, economics, and politics) into legislative and judicial, even 
though it is noteworthy that Blemmydes refers to modes of operation, not divisions. 
14 Bydén (2003: 445.70–446.81). 
15 The work is analysed by O’Meara in this volume. 
16 Duffy (1992: 1–4, esp. 3.55–4.96). 
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to Aristotle’s treatises.17 Another reason is that the alternative bipartite divi-
sion appears to have been viable only as long as Neoplatonic philosophy 
flourished in late antiquity. It lost its breeding ground once the philosophical 
schools which cultivated Neoplatonism declined or were closed by the first 
half of the seventh century. 
 
Does political philosophy matter? 
Classicism versus contemporary 
relevance 
The brief definitions of political philosophy in the divisiones philosophiae 
follow an antique tradition and are in a way antiquarian. By stating that the 
goal of political philosophy is the well-being of an urban community 
(πόλις), these definitions are at odds with the imperial politics and identity 
of Byzantium. Besides, cities in Byzantium after the seventh century were 
no longer self-governing communities like the antique πόλεις and could 
hardly be considered a realistic subject matter for political theory. Clearly 
Byzantine authors were reporting definitions of political philosophy carried 
over from the past and played on the derivation of the word ‘politics’ from 
‘πόλις’. An offshoot of this classicizing view of political philosophy was its 
understanding as the body of political writing by ancient philosophers. We 
may be reminded here of the Byzantine ‘school dialogue’ pointing to 
Aristotle’s treatises. 
Yet this academic approach turned back to the past did not fully suppress 
the urge of the authors of the classifications to apply empirical observation 
to the description of political philosophy. A certain effort for accommoda-
tion with historical reality may be seen in the admission on the part of John 
of Damascus, Eustratios of Nicaea, Nikephoros Blemmydes and Theodore 
Metochites that political philosophy could deal either with the well-being of 
a ‘city’ or of ‘cities’ in the plural. The word ‘πόλις’ itself was not irrelevant 
to Byzantium as an empire. Byzantium inherited from imperial Rome, to 
some degree at least, the tradition of seeing itself as a city-turned-empire 
and a city ruling over other cities. The term politeia (πολιτεία) of the 
Rhomaioi was used on a non-official level as a designation for the Byzantine 
state.18 Furthermore, the word ‘πόλις’ could refer to any model political 
community, and so veiled or explicit parallels could be drawn with the 
Byzantine polity. In particular, the regulatory activity of the statesman 
                                                
17 See above n. 9. 
18 See, for example, Mango (1990: 54.8–9; 68.19; 78.15). See also Beck (1970). 
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(πολιτικός) could reflect contemporary political preoccupations. As we 
shall see, Eustratios of Nicaea’s comments accompanying his classification 
of political philosophy draw a parallel between the emperor and the states-
man (πολιτικός) who governs the πόλις. Furthermore, the gulf separating 
ancient political philosophy and contemporary imperial politics did not re-
main unnoticed, and proved capable of leading to innovative reassessment. 
In the early fourteenth century Theodore Metochites asked himself what the 
focus of political philosophy should be. Eustratios and Metochites ap-
proached the traditional classifications in an original and critical way 
influenced by the contemporary historical environment, and I would like to 
discuss each case in detail. 
 
Eustratios of Nicaea’s preface to the Nicomachean Ethics: 
distributive justice 
The twelfth-century Byzantine philosopher Eustratios of Nicaea wrote at 
some length on the division of practical philosophy and its three constituent 
parts in the preface to his commented edition of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics.19 As is well known, Eustratios took a leading part in a project of re-
publishing the Nicomachean Ethics along with explanatory commentaries 
carried out under the patronage of the learned princess and historian Anna 
Komnene. The commentaries on some books were the work of earlier phi-
losophers, while twelfth-century authors composed the remaining ones—
Eustratios of Nicaea glossed Books I and VI, while Michael of Ephesus, 
Books V, IX and X. From among the three parts of practical philosophy, 
Eustratios chose in the preface to deal most extensively with politics: a cir-
cumstance explicable perhaps by the interest in this subject on the part of 
Eustratios or his patron.20 It is possible, too, that the preface anticipates the 
commented edition of both Aristotle’s Politics and Nicomachean Ethics. 
Michael of Ephesus glossed the former work, although in a less extensive 
fashion than his commentaries on Books V, IX and X of the Nicomachean 
Ethics.21 One may be reminded that Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics was 
itself a work of political theory. Aristotle considered his inquiry in the 
Nicomachean Ethics to be political and conceived of the work as an 
                                                
19 On Eustratios and his commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, see Tatakis (1959: 216–
18); Giocarinis (1964); Lloyd (1987); Mercken (1990: 410–19); Ierodiakonou (2005). 
20 Eustratios explains that the preface serves to clarify ‘in what ways the three kinds of 
practical philosophy differ, second, what each one of them constitutes, and third, what is 
the benefit each one of them brings to people.’ See Heylbut (1892: 1.23–25). 
21 On Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on the Politics, see most recently O’Meara (2008). 
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introduction to the Politics.22 Eustratios’ commentaries on Books I and VI 
inevitably touch upon issues of political interest. 
Eustratios’ excursus on political philosophy in the preface focuses on the 
role of the statesman (πολιτικός) in the establishment and maintenance of 
justice. After reporting the familiar view of the city-centred subject matter 
of politics, Eustratios turns his attention to the statesman. The statesman, he 
says, ought to be virtuous in every respect and ‘capable of transmitting 
goodness to all members of the polity, caring in every way for the citizens 
and the city, or cities, if he rules over many’.23 What follows is of particular 
interest: Eustratios envisaged justice in the city or cities as the allocation of 
appropriate shares among the citizens, which the statesman was to carry out. 
The statesman, according to Eustratios, would know well that 
… each ruler over more individuals of the same kind is obliged to take equal care of his 
subjects and of himself, not so that all would be receiving shares which are equal to his 
or simply equal with each other’s, but in accordance with proportion. For this is how 
cities are consolidated, namely, when everyone receives what is due to him. Depriving 
him [that is, everyone] of what is due reveals the governors of the cities as being unjust, 
predisposes the subjects to be lax about the good, and puts cities in a worse situation. 
This is the sense of Euripides’ words, ‘many cities suffer whenever a good and brave 
man receives no greater honour than his inferiors’ (Euripides, Hecuba 306–8).24 
Eustratios’ notion of the statesman making just distributions in accordance 
with the principle of just proportion has important antecedents in ancient 
philosophy. The late antique Neoplatonists, inspired by Plato’s Gorgias 
(508a) and Laws (756e–57c), exploited the idea of justice as allotment based 
on the geometrical proportionality of ratios.25 Probably a closer and more 
                                                
22 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1102a. The Nicomachean Ethics discusses political questions—for 
example, the supremacy of political science over other skills and sciences (1094a–b)—and 
devotes the entire Book V to the subject of justice. See Kraut (2002: 3–5; 98–177 [ch. 5: 
‘Justice in the Nicomachean Ethics’]). 
23 Heylbut (1892: 2.30–3.3, esp. 3.1–3): [τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα …] ἱκανὸν εἰσέτι καὶ τοῖς 
πολιτευοµένοις µεταδιδόναι τῆς ἀγαθότητος, παντοίως κηδόµενον πολιτῶν τε ἅµα 
καὶ πόλεως ἢ και πόλεων, εἰ πλειόνων τύχοι κρατῶν. 
24 Heylbut (1892: 3.3–12): … εἰδότα καλῶς ὡς ἕκαστος ἄρχων πλειόνων ὁµοφυῶν 
ἐπίσης ἑαυτῷ φροντίζειν τῶν ὑπὸ χεῖρα ὀφειλέτης ἐστίν, οὐχ ἵνα τῶν ἴσων ἐκείνῳ ἢ 
ἀλλήλοις ἁπλῶς τυγχάνοιεν ἅπαντες ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. οὕτω γὰρ αἱ πόλεις 
συνίστανται, τοῦ αὐτῷ ἀνήκοντος ἑκάστου τυγχάνοντος. Αἱ γὰρ ἀποστερήσεις τῶν 
ἀνηκόντων ἀδίκους µὲν τῶν πόλεων <τοὺς> προεστῶτας ἐλέγχουσι, ῥαθύµους δὲ 
περὶ τὰ καλὰ <τοὺς> ὑποκειµένους διατιθέασι, τὰς δὲ πόλεις ἐχούσας κακῶς ἀπερ-
γάζονται. τοιοῦτον γὰρ καὶ τὸ Εὐριπίδειον “ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ πάσχουσι αἱ πολλαὶ 
πόλεις, ὅταν τις ἐσθλὸς καὶ πρόθυµος ὢν ἀνὴρ µηδὲν φέρηται τῶν κακιόνων πλέον”. 
The quotation from Hecuba seems to have been proverbial and was excerpted in Stobaeus. 
See Wachsmuth & Hense (1884–1912: vol. IV, 6.1–3). 
25 O’Meara (2003: 102–3).  
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immediate source for Eustratios would have been the Nicomachean Ethics, 
the work on which he was just about to write a commentary. In Book V 
Aristotle divides justice into two kinds, distributive and corrective, and 
considers equality to be its most essential characteristic.26 Equality in 
distributive justice was to be accomplished by means of allocating shares 
proportionate with the relative ‘worth’ (ἀξία) of the recipient: a proportion-
ality that is geometrical in the sense of being based on the equality of 
quotients rather than arithmetical in the sense of being based on the equality 
of differences. Michael of Ephesos’ commentary on Book V of the 
Nicomachean Ethics gives an instructive example of distributive justice: if 
Achilles was twice as worthy as Ajax, it would be just that Achilles should 
receive twice the amount of coins given to Ajax. For example, if Ajax 
would receive four coins, it would be just for Achilles to get eight.27 
There are both clear and veiled allusions to twelfth-century Byzantium. 
Eustratios refers to the members of the political community (that is, ‘the city 
or cities’) as ‘subjects’ (οἱ ὑπὸ χεῖρα) to the statesman; the expression is a 
conventional Byzantine term designating the emperor’s subjects.28 The fo-
cus on just distribution parallels one of the prime functions of the imperial 
office, namely, the granting of court titles with their attendant salaries and 
the award of tax privileges, a practice which became increasingly common 
from the second half of the eleventh century onward.29 Just distribution had 
a particular resonance in the twelfth century. Critics attacked Emperor 
Alexios I (1081–1118) for confiscating church wealth at the beginning of 
his reign and especially for siphoning off public tax resources for the benefit 
of the extended and powerful Komnenian clan.30 In his classification of 
political philosophy Eustratios adds his voice to the choir by agreeing with 
the assumption of twelfth-century critics, namely, that the good ruler is the 
one who distributes resources justly among the subjects. Eustratios consid-
ers this kind of discussion to be a central subject matter for political 
philosophy. 
Further on in his preface, Eustratios continues to refer to the activity of 
the statesman in a way reminiscent of the Byzantine monarchical system. 
Famous leaders of the classical and biblical past—Moses, Joshua and 
Solon—are presented as paragons of political philosophy. It is interesting to 
                                                
26 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1130b30–1132b20. 
27 Hayduck (1901: 19–23). 
28 See, for example, the twelfth-century historian John Zonaras, in Büttner-Wobst (1897: 
562.11). 
29 Oikonomides (2002: 1039–48). See also Oikonomides (1996: 261–63). 
30 Magdalino (1983: 326–46). 
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find among them two legislators (Moses and Solon), a circumstance which 
seems to reflect the importance given to legislation as political philosophy 
in the Alexandrian Prolegomena.31 Eustratios revisits the role of legislation 
in the body of his commentaries, where he notes that the task of political 
science or philosophy (ἡ πολιτική) is not only the establishment of laws in 
the city, but also the upkeep of walls, the maintenance of public hygiene and 
of the water supply, the provisioning of the city, the making of right deci-
sions about war and foreign alliances, and the establishment of justice and 
proper religious worship.32 From among these pressing concerns for any 
political community, water supply and the upkeep of the city walls were 
particularly relevant to the imperial capital Constantinople. 
 
Metochites’ dilemma on political philosophy 
In the late Byzantine period, Theodore Metochites attacked vigorously an-
cient works of political philosophy, which he nonetheless considered a high-
ranking philosophical discipline. Metochites embarked on similar criticisms 
in two works: his early treatise On Ethics or Education and his subsequent 
collection of essays, Sententious Remarks (known commonly as the 
Miscellanea).33 Metochites’ life experience seems to have informed many of 
his views on political philosophy. A man of action as much as a philoso-
pher, Metochites rose to the post of highest imperial minister and was the 
real power behind the throne of Emperor Andronikos II’s government dur-
ing the 1310s and 1320s until the emperor’s downfall in 1328. In his treatise 
On Ethics or Education Metochites attacked Plato for exalting philosophy to 
the level of kingship (an allusion to the Republic) and for suggesting unre-
alistic political ideas.34 Not only had Plato’s political utopias never found 
their practical fulfilment in the past, Metochites notes, but they have no 
chance of ever doing so in the future. In a curious and important remark, 
                                                
31 Heylbut (1892: 4.5–7). Cf. ibid. 3.12–26, where Eustratios refers to the polity having four 
parts: legislative and judicial, taking care of one’s soul; and gymnastic and medical, taking 
care of one’s body. 
32 Heylbut (1892: 341.5–21). The context is a commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean 
Ethics (1142a2–6), where Aristotle illustrates the common understanding of prudence as an 
individual rather than a social virtue by citing Euripides. Eustratios digresses to show that 
an ethical virtue, such as prudence, differs qualitatively from economics and politics and 
then describes the preoccupation of each in detail. 
33 The treatise On Ethics or Education is usually considered to be one of the early works of 
Metochites, dated to 1297–98 (De Vries-Van der Velden 1987: 260) or around 1305 
(Ševčenko 1962: 141 n. 2; Polemis 1995: 8–9). The Sententious Remarks has been dated to 
the period between 1321 and 1328. See Hult (2002: xiv). 
34 Polemis (1995: 169–77 [chs. 35–36]). 
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Metochites describes this situation as appearing to amount to ‘an abolition 
(κατάλυσις) of the greatest and best part of philosophy, political philoso-
phy’.35 The expression is interesting on two counts. Firstly, it places politics 
within philosophy and even assigns to it (enigmatically in this context) a 
supreme rank within philosophy—in complete contrast to Psellos in his mi-
nor philosophical work mentioned above, which relegates politics to the 
lowermost rank in the taxonomic hierarchy.36 
Secondly and somewhat paradoxically, Metochites describes political 
philosophy as an abolished field of study. However, it is not that Metochites 
is sounding the death knoll of the discipline, even though this may be the 
first impression. Metochites speaks not of the ruin of political philosophy in 
general, but of political philosophy in antiquity in particular. In the immedi-
ately following passage Metochites remarks that political philosophy or 
science (ἡ πολιτική) should deal with the possibilities and circumstances 
encountered in real life. He likens the versatile knowledge of politics to the 
skill of a sailor who knows how to keep his ship afloat in good and adverse 
weather (a standard simile of classical origin used often in Byzantine court 
literature). Politics, he continues, is not a discipline dealing with ideals and 
perfect situations, but one which has to address the natural imperfection of 
human life. To back this idea, Metochites mentions that no one in his times 
knows a perfect embodiment of either physical beauty or political virtues, 
the moral virtues of the soul according to Neoplatonism, which he says that 
he has often studied. The reason, he explains, is that virtue faces the mate-
rial world which it could never fully control, a statement steeped in dualistic 
pessimism.37 We may be reminded here of Metochites’ sympathies toward 
the philosophical school of scepticism and its agnostic tendencies.38 
Metochites repeats and develops some of the above ideas in two of his 
essays in the Sententious Remarks (essays 80 and 81). Here he raises the 
question of why so few ancient philosophers concerned themselves with 
political philosophy and observes that those who did write on the subject 
shunned involvement in politics, preferring ethics to politics as an area of 
activity. Metochites explains this regrettable situation mainly through the 
preposterousness (κενολογία) of their political ideas. The ancient philoso-
                                                
35 Polemis (1995: 172.13–16 [ch. 36]): ἡ διὰ τὴν τούτων ἀτυχίαν τῶν πραγµάτων 
καθάπαξ ἀποχώρησις, ἤν τις τοῦτ' ἀξιοῖ, κατάλυσίς τις ἔοικε τῷ ὄντι εἶναι τοῦ µεγί-
στου τε καὶ καλλίστου µέρους φιλοσοφίας, τοῦ πολιτικοῦ. 
36 See above n. 16. 
37 Polemis (1995: 172.18–176.5 [ch. 36]). On the ‘political virtues’, see O’Meara (2003: 
40–42).  
38 Bydén (2002). 
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phers should have acted, according to Metochites, like doctors practising 
their craft and helping their fellow citizens. Instead they preferred an apo-
litical conduct, which Metochites contrasts to how a statesman (πολιτικός) 
should act in reality, namely, by dealing with the current affairs to the best 
of his capacity.39 Metochites’ criticism of specific ancient political philoso-
phers goes beyond Plato, who is mentioned both here and in his earlier 
treatise On Ethics or Education; now the criticism includes also Zeno, 
Chrysippus, Theophrastus, and mostly Aristotle whom Metochites chastises 
most severely.40 Metochites contrasts the ineffectual thinkers of antiquity 
with ancient legislators who contributed to the greatness of their states: 
Zoroaster and Cyrus among the Persians, Hanno among the Carthaginians, 
and especially King Numa Pompilius among the Romans, whose legislation 
set the Roman monarchy on a firm course until Metochites’ own times.41 
The emphasis on legislation, which hearkens back to Neoplatonic views in 
the Alexandrian Prolegomena, is again worthy of note. 
Metochites’ conception that political philosophy should address real life 
and situations corresponds to his own interest in issues of political theory. 
More than twenty essays in the Sententious Remarks discuss political sub-
jects of a varying degree of contemporary relevance, such as ancient con-
stitutions, the three classic forms of government, and state finances. The last 
issue was a particularly pressing one: the reign of Andronikos II saw fre-
quent fiscal crises and Metochites himself was the architect of the fiscal 
policies of the emperor during the later years of his reign. Therefore 
Metochites’ view in his treatise On Ethics or Education of political 
philosophy as ‘the greatest and best part of philosophy’ addressing practical 
goals foreshadows the political essays based on his greater experience in 
government in his collection of Sententious Remarks. 
  
The concept of royal science 
So far we have seen that the descriptions of politics in a series of Byzantine 
divisiones philosophiae composed in the course of many centuries were 
grounded in antique tradition, although they did occasionally go beyond 
what was expected from textbook definitions. I would like now to turn to a 
                                                
39 Sententious Remarks 81, in Müller & Kiessling (1821: 532–37, esp. 533.24–27; 537.13–
20). 
40 Sententious Remarks 80, in Müller & Kiessling (1821: 524–28). 
41 Sententious Remarks 80, in Müller & Kiessling (1821: 529–32). See also Sententious 
Remarks 107, in Müller & Kiessling (1821: 703–10), whose theme is the legislation of 
Numa Pompilius. 
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group of twelfth- and thirteenth-century taxonomic descriptions of philoso-
phy composed outside the scholastic context of the divisiones. These de-
scriptions link the Platonic concept of royal science (βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήµη) to 
political philosophy. It becomes necessary here to examine at the Platonic 
pedigree of this interesting concept and the history of its use by the late an-
tique Neoplatonists, the ‘immediate’ source for its reappearance in the elev-
enth century. The seminal Neoplatonic text to consider is the anonymous 
sixth-century dialogue On Political Science. The work has attracted much 
attention by scholars, although no attempt has been made to trace its 
influence on middle and late Byzantine political speculation. 
The concept of royal science entered lastingly the ancient philosophical 
tradition through Plato’s dialogue the Statesman.42 Here the skill of govern-
ment is referred to interchangeably as ‘political’ (πολιτική) and ‘royal’ 
(βασιλική) knowledge or science.43 The dialogue does not have the goal of 
addressing constitutional matters and leaves unexplained the distinction be-
tween ‘royal’ and ‘political’. In his critical response to Plato, Aristotle 
clarifies in the Politics (1252a8–17) that the king has a personal govern-
ment; however, he is called a statesman (πολιτικός) when the citizens rule 
and are ruled in turn in accordance with political science. The Statesman 
describes royal or political science as an expert knowledge similar to 
weaving, navigation and medicine; it uses the related skills of generalship, 
rhetoric and justice, setting them in motion whenever the right occasion for 
action arises.44 Aided by royal science, but not necessarily bound to the 
written law, the expert ruler is able to govern for the public benefit.  
Ancient philosophical tradition after Plato maintained sometimes the 
synonymous usage of ‘royal’ and ‘political’. For example, the Roman Stoic 
philosopher Musonius Rufus (d. c. AD 120) is said to have tried to convince, 
during his exile to Syria, a client king to the Romans of the benefits of phi-
losophy, specifying that Socrates called ‘philosophy a political and royal 
science (πολιτική τε καὶ βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήµη), because the one who re-
ceives it becomes a statesman straightaway’.45 The context does not explain 
the intended meaning of ‘political and royal science’, although it is note-
                                                
42 On this dialogue, see Lane (1997); Cooper (1999).  
43 On the identification or ‘royal’ and ‘political’, see Plato, Statesman 267c (‘kingship is 
another name for statesmanship’) and 276c. Cf. ibid. 266e; 274e; 289d; 291c; 305c–d; 
309d. The concept of ‘royal science’ is explicitly used in 261c; 284b; 288e; 292e; 295b; for 
‘political science’, see 303e. 
44 Plato, Statesman 303e–305e. 
45 The reference to the unity of philosophy and kingship goes back to Socrates’ words in the 
Republic (473d), although the vocabulary is also clearly that of the Statesman. See Lutz 
(1947: 66.24–26 [Discourse 8]). 
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worthy that the notion is tied to what was to become a commonplace in 
Byzantine court literature, namely, the Platonic idea of the philosopher-
king. Another example of usage of this concept is the fourth-century 
Athenian rhetorician Sopater who worked in Neoplatonic circles. In the 
opening section of his prolegomenon to Aelius Aristides, Sopater states that 
‘the science of the statesman is a royal care in governing.’46 The statesman 
(πολιτικός) is said to give orders to others without himself acting, since he 
is the supreme legislator. The finality of all other skills (generalship, judicial 
rhetoric, the manual crafts, etc.) is subordinated to him, because the states-
man contains and represents the good (καλόν) and happiness (εὐδαιµονία), 
while other arts and crafts act for the sake of happiness.47 
The sixth-century dialogue On Political Science attempts to construct a 
philosophical system around the Platonic notion of royal science.48 Unfortu-
nately, what survives today from the original six books of On Political 
Science is a fragment consisting of the end of Book 4 and a larger portion 
from the beginning of Book 5. The full scope of ideas discussed in the dia-
logue is thus unknown. Nevertheless, the surviving fragment is substantial 
enough to set the work into context. We know that the anonymous author, a 
contemporary of the emperor Justinian I (527–65), was schooled in Neo-
platonic philosophy.49 He was critically disposed to contemporary imperial 
politics. The programme of reforms outlined in Book 5 was markedly anti-
authoritarian in its proposition of a mixed constitution and laws for the 
election and retirement of emperors.50 
 The table of contents of Book 5 notes that one of the discussed themes is 
the concept of βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήµη and the link of royal science with, and its 
superiority over, other sciences and crafts.51 In the initial section of the 
book, the main interlocutor, Menodorus, mentions that an earlier part of the 
dialogue, now lost, has demonstrated the differences between royal science 
and philosophy, and has shown that royal and political philosophy ‘are one 
                                                
46 Lenz (1959: 128.5–6): ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἐπιστήµη βασιλικὴ τυγχάνει κατὰ τὴν 
διοίκησιν πρόνοια. On Sopater and the Neoplatonic context, see O’Meara (2003: 209–11). 
47 The source is Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1094a–b, where the end of political science is described 
as the finality of all crafts and sciences. 
48 All references below are to the Mazzucchi’s revised 2002 edition. The dialogue has 
recently been commented on and translated by Bell (2009: 49–79 [commentary], 123–88 
[translation]), who renders βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήµη into English as ‘imperial science’. 
49 See the detailed analysis by O’Meara (2002) and O’Meara (2003: 171–84). See also 
Praechter (1900).  
50 On the political ideas in the dialogue, see Fotiou (1981); Cameron (1985: 248–52, esp. 
249 n. 47); O’Meara (2003: 180–82); Angelov (2004: 506–11). 
51 Mazzucchi (2002: 18.2–4; 18.10–11). 
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and the same thing insofar as being divine imitation’.52 The lost part of the 
dialogue thus discussed Plato’s identification of kingly and political knowl-
edge. The extant section of Book 5 continues to use the concepts of ‘royal’ 
and ‘political science’ synonymously and interchangeably.53 It has been ar-
gued that the identification between royal and political science would have 
been explicated through the principle of Neoplatonic metaphysics, by which 
the first member in an ordered series both pre-contains and produces subse-
quent members. The surviving section of Book 5 presents kingship as the 
source and fountain of ‘political illumination’, which it communicates to the 
uppermost tier of a hierarchically arranged chain of offices and hence to the 
lower tiers of offices.54 
The dialogue also paints a picture of the genesis, mode of operation and 
metaphysical agency of political science. The emergence of political science 
is set in a Platonic myth of the Creation. Menodorus tells a story of how, 
soon after the Creation, humankind had found itself lying in the middle 
between the rational and the irrational, between a life of pure intellect and 
nature. This state of affairs led to internal turmoil in the soul (tossed to and 
fro without a sense of direction) and warfare in the political sphere. To 
mend the unhappy situation and ensure human survival, the Demiurge and 
divine foresight granted humankind the two gifts of dialectic and political 
science.55 The above description is heavily indebted to the Platonic tradi-
tion: the historical reconstruction of the polity hearkens to the Republic 
(369a ff.); the myth of the Creation is based on the Timaeus; the transcen-
dental origin of political knowledge finds parallels and explanations in the 
writings of late Neoplatonists.56 Political science secures human salvation 
(σωτηρία) through the actions of the statesman (πολιτικός). Having re-
ceived the knowledge of political science as a divine revelation at the time 
of the emergence of the political community, the πολιτικός is said to ap-
proach different sections of the polity differently. He teaches political 
science to those who are ‘by nature receptive (φύσει δεκτικοί)’, while others 
he saves through correct belief (ὀρθὴ δόξα) and the tradition of faith. 
Among others he introduces the custom of living a just life and the fear of 
the laws (that is, he is a lawgiver), and he teaches them to imitate his own 
                                                
52 Mazzucchi (2002: 21.9–11, esp. ll. 10–11: ὅτι ταὐτὸν βασιλεία τε καὶ πολιτικὴ 
φιλοσοφία οἷα θεοῦ µίµησις οὖσα). 
53 Mazzucchi (2002: 64–66).  
54 O’Meara (2003: 176–77). 
55 Mazzucchi (2002: 55.6–57.10). 
56 O’Meara (2003: 79; 94–97; 176). 
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good life.57 The πολιτικός is not identified with the βασιλεύς whose elec-
tion and ideal qualities are described elsewhere in the surviving fragment of 
Book 5; nonetheless, the activity of the πολιτικός is monarchical in so far 
as it represents top-down ordering of the polity and inasmuch as political 
science is also royal science. 
The salvation of humankind brought about by political science and the 
πολιτικός is both physical and metaphysical. After the πολιτικός sets the 
polity in order, the human race is able to regain its pristine state: ‘the heav-
enly metropolis’ (ἡ ἄνω µητρόπολις) from where it has been exiled.58 How 
this happens precisely is not explained in the extant fragment of the dia-
logue. The broad outline of the scheme of salvation finds close parallels in 
Neoplatonic philosophy: namely, the importance of political virtues as the 
first stage in the divinization of the soul, the return of the soul to the One, 
and the idea of a heavenly city.59 However, as scholars have warned, one 
should be cautious not to use these parallels to draw a hasty conclusion 
about the non-Christian religious beliefs of the author. The discussion of 
matters of metaphysics in the surviving part of the dialogue is brief and non-
polemical. As a counter-argument against the author’s paganism, one can 
point to the circumstance that the phrase ‘the heavenly metropolis’ used by 
the dialogue is attested solely among Christian authors and that the notion of 
return to the heavens corresponds to the Christian notion of salvation after 
the Fall of Man.60 
The sixth-century dialogue not only marks a peak in Neoplatonic politi-
cal philosophy, but is worlds apart in its sophisticated argumentation from 
the advisory ‘mirror of princes’ literature, the main genre of political theo-
rizing in the centuries immediately following Justinian I. The concept of 
royal science is absent from this court literature and appears to have been 
reintroduced during the upsurge of philosophical study in the eleventh cen-
tury. The eleventh-century Historia Syntomos, cogently attributed to 
Michael Psellos, mentions in the context of an excursus on ancient Roman 
                                                
57 Mazzucchi (2002: 59.1–15). 
58 Mazzucchi (2002: 60.1–8). 
59 O’Meara (2003: 176). 
60 A TLG search for the phrase ἡ ἄνω µητρόπολις shows that, apart from the sixth-century 
dialogue, it was used solely by Christian authors. See, for example, Gregory of Nazianzus, 
On the Holy Easter, in Migne (PG 36: col. 656A). The question of whether the author of 
the sixth-century dialogue is a pagan or a Christian has no easy and obvious answer; it is 
evident that he lived in a mixed Christian and pagan milieu. On this question (left similarly 
open but with different arguments), see O’Meara (2003: 183). Bell (2009: 76–79) also 
considers this question difficult to answer. 
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history that a muse taught βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήµη to King Numa Pompilius.61 
The idea of royal science being a divine gift to humankind is what we al-
ready saw in the sixth-century dialogue. Psellos’ usage seems to have been 
intentional and premeditated. The source for this section of the Historia 
Syntomos is the Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who re-
ports a story according to which the ancient Roman king received divine 
instruction in ‘royal wisdom’ (βασιλικὴ σοφία). It is noteworthy that 
Psellos modified the phrase ‘royal wisdom’ into ‘royal science’ (βασιλικὴ 
ἐπιστήµη).62 The substitution makes the passage from Dionysius of Halicar-
nassus fit the Neoplatonic idea of the divine origins of royal science and is 
explicable by Psellos’ instrumental role in the eleventh-century revival of 
Neoplatonism. 
After re-emerging in the eleventh century, the concept of royal science 
was linked with the classifications of practical philosophy. In the preface to 
his Epitome logica the thirteenth-century philosopher and monk Nikephoros 
Blemmydes remarks that ‘to say it briefly, reigning scientifically (τὸ βασι-
λεύειν ἐπιστηµονικῶς) is nothing else than the summit of practical philoso-
phy’. The explanation stated in the immediately following sentence is that 
the emperor holds the reins of judicial and legislative power in his hands, 
and when acting with care and erudition he is seen ‘as another God on 
earth’.63 Thus, the exalted position of royal science (this is how I understand 
the expression ‘reigning scientifically’), namely, at the apex of practical 
philosophy, is explained through the prerogatives of contemporary emperors 
as supreme legislators and supreme judges. The reference to legislation and 
justice is the same echo from the Neoplatonic bipartite division of practical 
philosophy which resonates, as we saw, also in Chapter 7 of the Epitome 
logica on the divisiones philosophiae.64 
The connotations of royal science in the preface to the Epitome logica 
can become clearer through further examination of the context. In terms of 
                                                
61 Aerts (1990: 2.22–24). Duffy & Papaioannou (2003: 219–29) have adduced convincing 
philological arguments in favour of Psellos’ authorship in spite of Aerts’ earlier objections 
(1990: viii–xv). The use of the concept of βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήµη itself lends support to 
Psellos’ authorship of the Historia Syntomos. 
62 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. Rom. 2.60.5. I would like to thank Stratis Papaioannou 
for this reference. It is interesting also that the Historia Syntomos reports the instruction of 
Numa as a fact, while Dionysius of Halicarnassus presents it as a story reported by some 
people. 
63 Nikephoros Blemmydes, Epitome logica, in Migne (PG 142: col. 689A–C, esp. 689B): 
καὶ ἵν’ εἴπω συντόµως τὸ πᾶν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ τὸ βασιλεύειν ἐπιστηµονικῶς ἢ τῆς 
πρακτικῆς φιλοσοφίας αὐτὸ τὸ ἀκρότατον. 
64 See above nn. 11–13. 
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genre the preface is a mixture of philosophical musings and laudation of the 
emperor John III Batatzes (1221–54), who had commissioned Blemmydes 
to compose the textbook on logic and sponsored his teaching activities.65 At 
the outset of the preface, Blemmydes lays out the similarity between king-
ship and philosophy, which boils down to the circumstance that both preside 
over their respective spheres. Kingship is the highest political dignity, while 
philosophy is the ‘art of arts and science of sciences’—one of the six 
definitions of philosophy reported in the late antique Prolegomena to phi-
losophy.66 When kingship and philosophy converge, the ruling power 
reaches perfection by imitating God and secures good life for the ruled. For 
‘as some great philosopher reckoned in the best fashion’ (Plato is not men-
tioned by name), the subjects would prosper when the emperor is a 
philosopher.67 It is this statement that is followed by the remark that ‘reign-
ing scientifically is the summit of practical philosophy’. In other words, 
royal science is the knowledge possessed by a philosopher-king. But what 
kind of knowledge is royal science specifically? 
Blemmydes’ stellar and politically powerful student and philosopher, the 
crown prince and for a brief time emperor of Nicaea Theodore II Laskaris 
(b. 1221/22, ruled 1254–58), develops further the notion of royal science. In 
his Satire of the Tutor Laskaris dwells at length on the importance of phi-
losophy in his education, emphasizing its special role for an imperial 
prince.68 The satire is a lengthy mockery of the tutor to whom Laskaris was 
unwillingly assigned as a teenager. Among the tutor’s many shortcomings is 
the alleged attempt to turn the crown prince away from the study of philoso-
phy. Laskaris enumerates the six classic definitions of philosophy and 
describes how each referred to the benefits to be derived from philosophy. 
The definition of philosophy as ‘the art of arts and the science of sciences’ is 
linked with the profit of obtaining knowledge of ‘the first science, that is, 
                                                
65 The preface is the prooimion both to an early first edition and the final edition of the 
Epitome logica. Carelos (2006: 401–2) re-edited recently the prooimion, describing it as an 
‘integrated mirror of princes’. However one finds here no traces of parainesis or 
didacticism characteristic of court advice literature. On Blemmydes’ preface to his Epitome 
and its connection with his teaching activities on logic, see Lackner (1981: 353); 
Constantinides (1982: 12); Macrides (2007: 194). See also Munitiz (1988: 71 and n. 91). 
66 Blemmydes was to repeat the same reasoning in ch. 6 of his mirror of princes, the 
Imperial Statue. See Hunger & Ševčenko (1986: 44–46). On philosophy as the art of arts 
and science of sciences, see the Prolegomena by Elias (Busse 1900a: 20.18–23) and David 
(Busse 1900b: 26.26–28). 
67 Nikephoros Blemmydes, Epitome logica, in Migne (PG 142: col. 689A–B). The 
inspiration is Plato’s Republic X 689a–b. 
68 This is an idea which Laskaris was to revisit during his more mature years when ruling as 
a sole emperor. See Angelov (2007: 238). 
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royal science (βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήµη)’. Laskaris presents royal science in the 
following manner: 
[I needed to be a philosopher] inasmuch as philosophy is ‘the art of arts and science of 
sciences’, so that, subject to the providence of God and to conformity with nature that 
serves God’s command, I, who am the crown upon humankind, would have the entire 
scientific knowledge of the first science, that is, royal science. For from there [from 
royal science] gaze the wise man and the private individual, the common craftsman and 
the soldier, the wrong-doer and the just man, the one who is judged and the judge, the 
bravest and the vanquished, the diligent and the indolent, the rich and the poor, house-
holds, villages, cities, and the world, and to put it shortly, all the people. Compile a 
work regarding what kind of man the person whose lot it is to govern should be! This is 
the reason why I very much needed to be a philosopher. For I think it is necessary for 
the rulers to know science and to do nothing without it.69 
Like his teacher Blemmydes, Laskaris considered royal science a philoso-
phical discipline. He expected to study the subject during his philosophical 
education and ridiculed an unfortunate teacher who dared think otherwise. 
In fact, Laskaris expected to gain the knowledge of royal science by reading 
a mirror of princes, for the expression ‘what kind of man the person whose 
lot it is to govern should be’ was used during the late Byzantine period in 
reference to works of court advice literature.70 This circumstance may clar-
ify Laskaris’ otherwise enigmatic comment that all kinds of people, both 
virtuous and not, ‘gaze from’ royal science: they stare from the pages of a 
mirror of princes like Blemmydes’ Imperial Statue, which illustrates virtues 
and vices through numerous historical and mythological figures. Like 
Blemmydes, Laskaris considered royal science a high-ranking subject: what 
Blemmydes had called ‘the summit of practical philosophy’ was for 
Laskaris ‘the first science’. Laskaris comes close to Blemmydes’ Epitome 
logica also by using the definition of philosophy as ‘the art of arts and the 
                                                
69 Tartaglia (2000: 180.632–181.646): διὰ δὲ τοῦ ‘τέχνη τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστήµη 
ἐπιστηµῶν’, ἵνα ἐπὶ θεοῦ προνοίᾳ καὶ φύσεως ἀκολουθίᾳ ὑπηρετούσης τ ῷ θείῳ 
προστάγµατι, τ ῆς πρώτης ἐπιστήµης, τ ῶν γε κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον ὢν 
κορωνίς, τ ῆς βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήµης φηµί, παντοίαν ἔχω τ ὴν ἐπιστήµην—ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ 
ἐνορᾷ καὶ σοφὸς καὶ ἰδιώτης, καὶ βάναυσος καὶ στρατιώτης, καὶ ἀδικῶν καὶ δικαιο-
πραγῶν, καὶ κρινόµενος καὶ δικάζων, καὶ ἀριστεύων ὡς καὶ ἡττώµενος, καὶ 
σπουδαῖος καὶ ὀκνηρός, καὶ πένης καὶ πλούσιος, καὶ οἶκος καὶ κώµη, καὶ πόλεις καὶ 
κόσµος, καὶ συνελὼν ε ἴπω π ᾶς ὁ λαός· ὁποῖον γοῦν τ ὸν ἄρχειν λαχόντα δεῖ εἶναι 
σύναξον. διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ἔδει µε ἄκρως φιλοσοφεῖν· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἡγοῦµαι γινώσκειν 
τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐπιστήµην καὶ ἄτερ ταύτης πράττειν µηδέν. The interpretation of this 
passage is not without difficulty. The preposition ἐπί in the phrase  ἐπὶ θεοῦ προνοίᾳ is the 
editor’s sensible emendation from ἐπεί found in the manuscripts. I have translated the word 
ἐκεῖθεν with its most common meaning of ‘from there’, ‘thence’. 
70 The title of the fourteenth-century paraphrase of Blemmydes’ mirror of princes The 
Imperial Statue is given in this way in some of the manuscripts. See Hunger & Ševčenko 
(1986: 45); Migne (PG 142: coll. 611–12). 
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science of sciences’ in a similar context, although in this case he engages in 
a play of words appropriate for a satire and argues that the definition shows 
that royal science is a worthy philosophical subject. 
A concept used by Laskaris in his descriptions of royal science reminds 
one of the dialogue On Political Science. His qualification of royal science 
as ‘the first science’ corresponds to the idea in the sixth-century dialogue 
about the early emergence of political science after the Creation and to 
Menodorus’ words that political science is the ‘first good’ (πρῶτον ἀγα-
θόν), and the best and greatest skill.71 Royal science was thus ‘the first sci-
ence’ both temporally and in terms of value. The same idea is conveyed by 
the table of contents of Book 5 of the dialogue, which states that one of its 
subjects is the superiority of royal science over other arts and sciences. Un-
fortunately, this section of Book 5 has been lost. 
Does the reappearance of the notion of royal science in Byzantium after 
the eleventh century indicate the influence of the sixth-century dialogue? 
Examining one last piece of evidence can help us to arrive at a plausible hy-
pothesis. A twelfth-century imperial panegyric of the emperor Manuel I 
Komnenos (1143–80) by Michael Italikos contains an interesting descrip-
tion of royal science, which, as far as I am aware, is unique in the middle 
Byzantine period.72 A teacher of philosophy, rhetoric and medicine in 
Constantinople, Italikos included in the oration quotations from the 
Republic by which he strove to display his learning to the court audience.73 
The epideictic function of the imperial oration is neither unusual nor sur-
prising, and it is important to realize that Italikos considered the rhetorical 
work to be a forum for the presentation of philosophical ideas. The oration 
lauds Manuel for having mastered at an early age, through the instruction 
given by his father, Emperor John II Komnenos, the art of war and royal 
science (βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήµη).74 Just as in the case of Laskaris, therefore, 
royal science is understood as a field of knowledge taught to princes. Fur-
ther on in the oration, Italikos engages in a description of royal science as a 
master craft surpassing all political skills and sciences: 
It was necessary that he [sc. the prince Manuel] learned royal science as a more mas-
terly craft [than strategy], which subjugates all peoples to it and governs cities and all 
                                                
71 Mazzucchi (2002: 63.4–8). See also ibid. 64.12–14 (citation from Xenophon, 
Memorabilia 4.2.11). 
72 On Italikos, see Treu (1895); Fuchs (1926: 38); Tatakis (1959: 218–19); Gautier (1972: 
14–28); Kazhdan (1991). On Italikos as a teacher as well as on his oration in praise of 
Manuel, see Magdalino (1993: 333–35; 435–38). 
73 Gautier (1972: 282.1–2; 282.9–10). 
74 Gautier (1972: 282.23). 
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parts of the universe. For she [royal science] issues orders about actions to be carried 
out in the best possible manner, uses as her tools other powers, namely rhetoric and 
strategy, carries everything, so to speak, by attaching it to herself, and presides over all 
political [sciences and skills], just as the First Philosophy presides over all other sci-
ences and skills and is called ‘the art of arts and the science of sciences’.75 
It is interesting to find here a third example of a Byzantine author citing the 
definition ‘art of arts and science of sciences’ in order to place royal science 
within the divisions of knowledge. In this case, Italikos understands the ‘art 
of arts and science of sciences’ to be metaphysics, which Aristotle calls First 
Philosophy. The comparison here, therefore, is between metaphysics and 
royal science, the former presiding over the theoretical disciplines and the 
latter commanding as a master craft all other political sciences and crafts. 
Italikos’ description of royal science is richer in philosophical terminology 
than those of Blemmydes and Laskaris, and weaves together Platonic and 
Aristotelian notions. Thus, the Platonic concept of royal science is linked to 
the notion of an architectonic master craft, which Aristotle applies in the 
opening of the Nicomachean Ethics to political science.76 Rhetoric and strat-
egy appear as ancillary crafts to royal or political science both in Plato and 
Aristotle: the Statesman refers to rhetoric, strategy and justice as tools of 
royal science, while the Nicomachean Ethics speaks of rhetoric, strategy and 
economics as crafts subordinate to political science.77 
The three descriptions of royal science by Michael Italikos, Nikephoros 
Blemmydes and Theodore II Laskaris share among themselves similarities 
with the sixth-century dialogue, which may be summarized as follows:  
(1) The Byzantine authors view royal science as philosophical knowl-
edge and a part of philosophy. Blemmydes comes closest to making a 
classificatory statement when naming royal science the apex of practical 
philosophy. All three authors assign royal science a supreme place in the 
hierarchy of knowledge: master craft, the apex of practical philosophy, the 
first science. 
(2) All three authors explain the philosophical affinity of royal science 
through the definition of philosophy (or First Philosophy) as the art of arts 
                                                
75 Gautier (1972: 283.14–21): τὴν δέ γε βασιλικὴν ἐπιστήµην ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικωτέραν 
ἐχρῆν ἐκµαθεῖν, πάντα ὑφ’ ἑαυτὴν ποιουµένην ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις καὶ µερίδας ὅλας τοῦ 
σύµπαντος διακυβερνῶσαν· αὕτη γὰρ περὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν ὡς ἄριστα διατάττεται 
καὶ χρᾶται ταῖς ἄλλαις δυνάµεσιν, ὡς ὀργάνοις, ῥητορικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ, καὶ ὥσπερ 
εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀναδησαµένη φέρει τὰ πάντα καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἁπασῶν ὑπερκάθηται, 
καθάπερ ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία τ ῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστηµῶν καὶ τεχνῶν, τέχνη λέγεται 
τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστήµη ἐπιστηµῶν. 
76 Eth. Nic. 1094a26–28. 
77 Plato, Statesman 305c–d; Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1094a27–b6. 
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and science of sciences. The superiority of royal science over other sciences 
and arts is one of the subjects of the sixth-century dialogue. 
(3) Two of the three authors (Michael Italikos and Theodore Laskaris) 
assume that an imperial prince can learn royal science through instruction, 
whether by an emperor-father versed in it or by a philosopher capable of 
composing a discourse on kingship. The sixth-century dialogue mentions in 
a similar fashion that the statesman (πολιτικός) teaches political science to 
people receptive to it by nature. 
The three areas of convergence with the sixth-century dialogue are 
significant enough to indicate intellectual continuity, but by themselves do 
not constitute sufficient evidence for concluding that there was direct de-
pendence on the late antique work. No quotations from the dialogue On 
Political Science are identifiable, and the Byzantine reception of the work is 
known to have been unenthusiastic: one single mention of it in Photios’ 
Bibliotheca and a single palimpsest manuscript in which the dialogue sur-
vives. Furthermore, the descriptions of royal science by the three Byzantine 
authors are brief and synoptic, omitting important points made in the sixth-
century dialogue, such as the identification of political and royal science or 
the metaphysical role of political science. One is perhaps justified to envis-
age an intermediate source in the form of a simplified epitome or a 
philosophical chapter dealing with royal science, which would have been 
derived from the dialogue. An epitome like this could have been produced 
in the eleventh century, a time of revival of philosophical studies, when 
summaries of philosophical subjects were produced in the Psellian milieu.78 
This hypothesis finds support in the circumstance that the earliest middle 
Byzantine texts in which the notion of royal science reappears are the writ-
ings of Michael Psellos, including the Historia Syntomos and, as we will 
shortly see, also one of his orations. The suggested explanation of how the 
dialogue could have exerted indirect influence is only a plausible hypothe-
sis. Further work and the edition of new philosophical texts may help to 
shed fresh light on the issue. 
No matter what the path of transmission of the concept of royal science 
may have been, it is important to note that it gained wider currency in vari-
ous non-philosophical contexts after the eleventh century. In Byzantine 
historiography and rhetoric βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήµη referred to the body of 
knowledge which emperors acquired through instruction in order to be able 
to govern wisely and effectively. The Historia syntomos attributed to 
                                                
78 One immediately thinks of the philosophica of Psellos or the philosophical work from the 
Psellian milieu preserved in Cod. Barocci 131 and edited by Pontikos (1992). 
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Psellos refers to the wise Roman king Numa being taught royal science by a 
muse. In a context closer to his own times, Psellos refers to the emperor 
Constantine IX Monomachos (1042–55) acquiring ‘royal science’ through 
the enlightened influence of a philosopher-advisor.79 Anna Komnene’s 
Alexiad speaks of how the emperor Alexios I regarded his mother Anna 
Dalassene as a ‘leader in royal science’ and therefore confided in her so 
strongly as to entrust her with extraordinary powers.80 In his History George 
Pachymeres notes that Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos (1282–1328) 
mastered ‘royal science’ at an early age; therefore, the emperor initially re-
jected the recommendation of his advisors to disband the Byzantine fleet as 
a money-saving measure, although in the end this unwise decision was 
made.81 The Platonic concept thus became applied to the characterization of 
educated emperors in Byzantine literature and historiography. 
 
Conclusion 
This investigation has traced the Byzantine understanding of the place and 
nature of politics in the classification of philosophy. Of special interest has 
been the question of whether and how political philosophy as described in 
the classifications corresponded to contemporary politics. It is beyond doubt 
that the divisiones philosophiae conceived of political philosophy as an 
autonomous discipline. The Aristotelian tripartite division of practical phi-
losophy, with politics as one of its legitimately constituted fields, was the 
common view during the Greek Middle Ages. The alternative Neoplatonic 
division of practical philosophy into two branches was generally not fol-
lowed, although awareness of it is evidenced in the writings of Byzantine 
philosophers (Psellos especially, and to a lesser extent Blemmydes and 
Metochites). 
The description of political philosophy in the divisiones philosophiae is 
usually brief, based on school tradition leading back to late antiquity, and 
articulated through ancient politico-philosophical terminology. The resultant 
academic and classicizing perspective is sometimes accompanied by a rarer 
view which takes imperial politics into consideration. The latter view also 
availed itself of ancient philosophical concepts, both Platonic and Aristote-
lian. Some of the classifications describe political philosophy as a field 
concerned with the activity of the statesman who brings good order and jus-
                                                
79 Dennis (1994: 434–35) (Or. 17). The context is Psellos’ panegyric of his teacher John 
Mauropous, Metropolitan of Euchaita, who is said to have been an advisor to the emperor.  
80 3.7.5.5–8, esp. 7–8: ὡς ἐξάρχῳ βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήµης ταύτῃ προσεῖχε τὸν νοῦν. 
81 Failler (1984–99: vol. III, 83.9–12). 
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tice to the πόλις or πόλεις. This view reflects a common top-down model of 
social theorizing and political ordering in Byzantium. The association of 
royal science with political philosophy served to connect political theory 
and social reality. Originally discussed in Plato’s dialogue the Statesman 
(from where the very notion of the statesman derives) as the expert craft of 
governing, and elaborated later by the Neoplatonists, the concept referred in 
Byzantium to the historically specific knowledge of imperial rule. The no-
tion of royal science worked as a bridge linking different periods and 
spheres: a bridge from antiquity to Byzantium, from philosophy to politics, 
and from political philosophy as a discipline to the advisory works on the 
ideal emperor and imperial governance. 
Traditionally, historians of philosophy have observed the relatively low 
level of interest in political philosophy in Byzantium in comparison with 
logic, ethics and the subjects of theoretical philosophy. From the point of 
view of commentaries on ancient philosophy and scholastic texts, this ob-
servation is justified. Yet when account is taken of the taxonomic ordering 
of political philosophy, the view of royal science advocated by some 
Byzantine philosophers after the eleventh century opens the door of 
philosophy to the large, diverse and rich body of kingship literature. The 
word ‘literature’ is used intentionally, because the bulk of the works in 
question is rhetorical by genre and discourse (mirrors of princes, orations, 
works critical of emperors, etc.). To what extent and which works of this 
literature may be deemed philosophical in the context of the history of 
Byzantine philosophy are questions in need of further study. What is 
apparent is that the authors who used the notion of royal science include 
some of the most original Byzantine political thinkers, such as Michael 
Psellos, Theodore II Laskaris and George Pachymeres, who were philoso-
phers with wide-ranging interests. It is likely that they would have 
considered kingship literature to belong to the field of political philosophy. 
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